Fourth Strike on Ust-Luga Confirmed Enemy Air Defense Failure

March 31, 2026April 1, 2026

This night Ukraine’s Defense Forces delivered the fourth strike on Ust-Luga and port infrastructure. As enemy sources report, high-precision debris struck again. Moreover, over all these four (or more?) attacks on the port, nothing except debris flew there. Note that we’re used to calling such “debris” good birds¹.

Overall, everyone sees that with each strike, enemy infrastructure falls harder. After all, drone strikes themselves can’t inflict irreversible consequences on such a huge complex. But fuel leaking from reservoirs and burning for a week already unconditionally inflicts the main damage on all technological equipment they long and strenuously hauled there, assembled, and configured. Even metal structures that underwent prolonged high temperature exposure irreversibly lose their clearly defined properties.

Considering Ust-Luga’s capacity was gigantic, the tanks standing there are particularly large sizes. Previous destructions of oil depots with fuel storage taught us the enemy has reservoirs of two main volumes — 5 thousand cubic meters and 10 thousand cubic meters. We remember how long fuel burned out from such reservoirs. Ust-Luga has reservoirs of 30 thousand cubic meters. At minimum, good birds managed to catch one of these. I think precisely now Orcs² understood how vulnerable such infrastructure is if someone truly takes it on. Obviously, Ukraine’s Defense Forces took it on very well.

Where’s the Air Defense? Nowhere, Apparently

As noted in previous publications, today’s strike demonstrates practically complete air defense absence at the target location. The fourth strike on Ust-Luga forced even propagandists to admit something’s fundamentally wrong with their layered defense concept. The enemy was obliged to decide something about air defense after the first strike but didn’t. Didn’t after the second either. After the third — also not. Now we’re at the point “after fourth strike”, and unknown whether the enemy does anything or not.

However, OSINT analysts accumulated quite interesting information that can somewhat explain. Initially this region got covered by a multi-layered air defense system. We won’t call it echeloned, but layers definitely existed.

The first layer of the entire system was specialized Kasta-2E2 radars. They aren’t part of some specific SAM system but serve as means of detecting and tracking air targets at quite large distance. Most importantly, everything that flies — from light drones to aircraft. Kasta-2E2 is a mobile low-altitude three-coordinate radar station designed for airspace control and air target detection, including low-flying aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles. It gets used in air defense systems, border control, and air traffic management.

Kasta-2E2 vs AWACS

Open sources directly indicate these complexes got created to see good birds and issue their coordinates in advance to SAM systems covering the target location. Moreover, due to a mast that can raise the radar to 50 meters height, the radar can see far and fix low-flying targets regardless of terrain relief. Kasta-2E2 radar can issue coordinates and target types not only for ground air defense means but also for fighter aviation. But as visible, the enemy didn’t use aviation either.

Therefore, the concept of placing such stations provided for forming the entire air defense outer perimeter on a permanent basis. Understandably, an AWACS aircraft can see farther and has far greater possibilities for combining with various destruction means. But the trick here: all these possibilities are relevant only while the aircraft is airborne. Ensuring constant data flow of such character, even in truncated form, is precisely these Kastas’ obligation. In this location they were positioned approximately like this:

The forested terrain of these latitudes, which often obstructs other radars, gets negated by the complex’s sliding mast that allows installing the locator above treetops. This entire area should have been covered by several radars at once. Specifically, they should have detected drone approach from Estonia’s and Finland’s territories. In other words, from the very beginning everything got conceived as needed… but satellite images from recent months show empty platforms where these very Kastas initially stood.

Where Did All the Radars Go?

Here our General Staff’s regular reports and SBU video reports about hitting these radars on temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory, most often in Crimea, come to help. Kasta-2E2 radar is quite a large complex. If its mast is deployed, it can’t move and becomes an ideal strike object. This radar itself doesn’t enter the composition of a specific SAM system. Even if it fixes a target heading toward it, only SAM systems of an adjacent unit can intercept it. But if they couldn’t — we have one more empty spot near Ust-Luga and nothing to close it with.

The fourth strike on Ust-Luga, on one and the same port, without adequate air defense work, says Orcs would very much like to cover the port but have nothing to do it with. Moreover, here we reasoned only about Kasta radar. But absolutely no enemy air defense worked at all. This can directly indicate the enemy air defense inner layer (Buks and Tors) also got transported to occupied Crimea where it subsequently got destroyed.

Strange “partner” ask

Final touch to this picture. A number of reports passed through press that some of our partners ask to stop strikes on Russian oil industry. As far as can be understood, one “partner” has a tuft the color of donkey piss, and his logic is very clear. First he temporarily canceled sanctions against Pootin’s oil. Then he allowed Pootin to transport oil to Cuba. Therefore, such a request is a continuation of the logical chain.

Interesting that the more evidence of military aid Pootin provides to Iran surfaces online, the more Donnie gives Pootin indulgences. It already reached the point that American press published data about American assets in the region that Orcs give to the bearded ones. But Donnie continues licking “friend vladimir” same as before. For example, how did the bearded ones learn where US Air Force AWACS aircraft stand to hit one of them so precisely?

But if Donnie demands strikes on Pootin’s oil industry stop, he doesn’t consider several nuances. Donnie now tries to do what President Biden did when he heard horror stories about “conflict escalation”. But Biden’s demands got backed directly by threat of suspending military aid to Ukraine. Precisely therefore a number of restrictions existed that we remember perfectly well. Considering the volume of aid Biden sanctioned, we had to take into account applying certain weapon types.

Donnie Doesn’t Have Cards

Today practically no aid comes from the USA. Everything supplied to Ukraine from the USA gets paid at prices the USA itself set. Thus, this is no longer aid but ordinary trade profitable to American military industry same as to Ukrainian army. In other words, Trump tries to climb into Biden’s skin without having the cards Biden had.

We do our own work. Western sanctions on oil export, though they inflicted certain losses on Orcs and created inconveniences, still didn’t lead to decisive situation change. Therefore Ukraine’s Defense Forces started acting on the principle: if you want everything done right — do it yourself. The fourth strike on Ust-Luga turned out an indicator of the direction our military moves. Right now we observe a picture where the enemy can conserve its own wells without a single strike precisely on them.

If oil has nowhere to go, extracting it makes no sense. Oil goes either raw for export or to processing and chemical plants where after processing it turns into gasoline and diesel. Then the finished product goes for export and ensures war financing. Ports burn not just like that. This burning, according to Media data, deprived the enemy of 40% of its oil export.

¹Good Birds – slang for strike drones. Why “good”? Because they bring “warmth and light” to enemy military factories, ammunition depots, and oil refineries. Sarcastic? Of course. Effective? Even more so.

²Orcs – a common term for Russians who support or participate in the armed aggression against Ukraine. Dehumanizing? Yes. Accurate? Also yes.