Tanker Attacks Timing: Why Now, Not Year Ago?

December 3, 2025December 3, 2025

Before we analyze why tanker attacks timing raises so many questions — why they started only now and not earlier — let’s establish the analytical methodology. It’s long been well known that for more or less correct conclusions about a subject or phenomenon, you need to collect the maximum possible number of facts. Arrange them in chronological sequence. After that, establish other interconnections that exist between them. In other words, knowing how the subject of study should look, you can be confident about what should be in a specific place at a specific time, simply based on the subject’s nature. If emptiness appears here, it immediately indicates that the general appearance of the subject doesn’t correspond to reality.

And from this point of view, let’s examine what was happening, and perhaps is still happening now, with vessels transporting russian oil. We’ve already read indignant statements from Turkey, near whose shores several tankers were hit. Overall, this entire picture looks somewhat strange and not very logical. It clearly lacks some important details that prevent seeing it completely. By the way, Pootin’s frankly stupid reaction to everything happening doesn’t fit into it.

Why Tanker Attacks Are So Effective

Let’s start with the fact that attacking tankers carrying russian oil is an extremely effective means of fighting shadow export of russian oil. This isn’t only, or even mainly, about disabling the vessels themselves. It’s about the precedent itself and the real threat of attacks on tankers. At minimum, such attacks raise tanker insurance prices because risks become extreme. Moreover, here the line is clearly crossed between insuring certain assets operating in peacetime and assets operating in wartime.

War insurance is a completely different story. Only a few will insure such things at horse rates. The rest will simply exclude the event from the definition of “insured event.” The owner of an attacked vessel will at minimum not receive insurance compensation. At maximum, they’ll lose insurance because contrary to its terms, they operate in a combat zone. Under such circumstances, vessels not purchased with russian money will simply refuse dubious voyages to russia’s shores.

This factor won’t become decisive for the collapse of oil exports. But it will become something like an increasing coefficient in the general formula of our military’s influence on the enemy oil industry. In other words, oil pipelines, cargo terminals, and other equipment designed for oil export are partially disabled on one hand. On the other hand, attacks on tankers have already begun.

The Timing Doesn’t Add Up

All this wasn’t hard to predict even before the start of strikes on the export arm of russia’s oil industry. Moreover, the beginning of strikes on these assets aimed to create exactly such a situation as we’re observing right now. This means the painfulness of strikes on such lapty* assets was understood long ago. But the strikes themselves only began now. And here lies some element of inconsistency.

But if we understood the importance of inflicting precisely this kind of damage on the enemy long ago, why does tanker attacks timing puzzle us so much? Why did they delay for so long? Essentially, such strikes use weapons that have been in service for at least two years. Considering how far sea drones went already a year and more ago, the distances at which tankers with russian oil were attacked have long been accessible to them. This indicates that drones have long been provided with corresponding communication channels that allow them to successfully operate at any point in the Black Sea waters.

Moreover, the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol and generally the western coast of temporarily occupied Crimea quite a long time ago. This means the enemy long ago couldn’t ensure protection of its own sea communications by naval means. The only possibility is using aviation for these purposes. But everyone understands that modern ships have a much larger arsenal of means for detecting precisely naval targets. Therefore, aviation’s effectiveness in this regard approaches zero. And this state of affairs existed last year and the year before, when attempts to restore a maritime patrol system ended for the enemy with damage or destruction of its ships.

The Missing Factor

This indicates that from a technical point of view, such operations were quite feasible a year or even more ago. In other words, despite all the importance and obvious expediency of such operations, they still weren’t conducted even with available forces and means. Therefore, in this formula there was at least one more, extremely important factor that restrained the beginning of this epic.

Let’s say, until the end of Joe Biden’s term, this state of affairs could rest on his existential fears from the very possibility of strikes on lapty oil industry. But the US elections took place over a year ago. We’re only observing the current picture for about 20 days, when after strikes on lapty loading terminals, strikes on their tankers began. This means the factor restraining such strikes stopped operating approximately by mid-November.

The US Sanctions Connection

And then we come to the conclusion that all this connects with the introduction of US sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil at the end of October. Obviously, some time went into tacit clarification of Ukraine’s and USA’s positions in this arrangement. Probably, someone raised the question about connecting our military to physical enforcement of these sanctions. They gave permission and lifted Biden’s restriction on strikes of this type.

It follows that having received permission for strikes from the USA, Ukraine couldn’t fail to inform Turkey that the concept had changed. There’s confidence that such strikes didn’t become a surprise for Erdogan.

Another thing is that Turkey tries to extract benefit from any situation, including this one. For example, Kazakhstan is now stirring its pistons and sharply intensifying efforts to create an oil bridge through Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The Proof: Turkey Knew in Advance

There’s another very telling moment that confirms what’s stated above. The tanker attacks timing reveals everything, attacks on tankers began only a few days ago, but:

Turkey cut imports of russian Urals oil in November by a third compared to October against the backdrop of tightening Western sanctions… The reduction in imports by Turkey is connected with the fact that American sanctions against Lukoil and Rosneft reduced the number of suppliers with whom Turkish refineries can work… In addition, the EU’s planned ban on purchasing fuel produced from russian oil, which should take effect at the end of January 2026, forces Turkish companies to diversify raw material supplies.

And it’s all very simple. Erdogan simply knew what would happen next. Well, and his loud speeches — that’s Eastern color, which should be perceived accordingly.