What Went Wrong with Russian Spring Offensive on Zaporizhzhia

March 22, 2026March 22, 2026

This is the first part of an analytical article on the Russian Spring Offensive. The next part will come later — once the shelling stops and a stable internet connection is available. Western amateur analysts who constantly publish their impressions of the war in Ukraine unanimously write that Orcs¹ indeed launched their spring-summer offensive campaign on the Zaporizhzhia strategic direction. Previously, they reported that the enemy had quietly transferred some of its best forces there – marines and airborne units. They provided a brief description of where these units were located after last year’s summer campaign ended.

By the way, the author of these lines got a real kick out of a phrase on the ISW website. I always assumed that such a serious project had to speak strictly formally and could never troll the Orcs. But then I saw this and showed it to the guys:

And nobody could stop smiling. We’ve long known that the Orcs live in an alternate reality, but seeing it on the ISW website was unexpected. If the ISW author ever reads this, let them know: Ukrainian soldiers rated that humor a solid 5 out of 5. As for us, we continue our own analysis — the kind where contempt for the enemy is seen as something natural and necessary.

Kill Zone Doubled

According to analysts data, some units were in the rear, where they replenished with personnel, equipment and conducted training. Some units didn’t participate in combat operations since last August, and the latest recorded withdrawal to the rear was October last year. Simply put, Pootin prepared a strike force grouping from fresh, rested and replenished units. They should in spring they would ensure front line breakthrough. As far as can be judged from media descriptions, the russian spring offensive was planned to start somewhat later, but the frontline situation changed dramatically.

Starlink disconnection turned out to be a very strong blow for enemy forward units, forcing them to switch to other communication variants. However, this factor should have delayed the offensive. The enemy needed time to restore communications and coordination using the means still available to the Orcs. However, they had to start earlier, and the acceleration proved forced. Because with one dash, Ukrainian Armed Forces doubled the kill zone.

This change led to enemy forces and means preparing for the offensive finding themselves in the guaranteed destruction zone by Ukrainian drones. Moreover, the enemy itself notes that heavier drones flew into the rear, causing significantly greater damage. What’s important — existing shelters for equipment, weapons, ammunition and personnel proved vulnerable, and changing shelters is already too late.

We remember how strikes by our good birds and missiles literally over the last few weeks destroyed large ammunition depots, control centers and bases of their bright drone operators “Rubicon”. Recent days in our General Staff reports practically daily record strikes on personnel concentration points. This is precisely what the enemy accumulated for the offensive. Things reached the point where their lettered trains with fuel and ammunition got knifed — drones tore them apart right on the move.

Preemptive Strike

The enemy reached a point where staying in the concentration zone became as dangerous as launching an offensive. Judging by the situation, the Orcs decided that if losses were inevitable, they should push forward and at least make them combat losses. This decision was also driven by our assault units on this sector. They broke through enemy defenses and began liberating our territory — something that had not happened since 2023.

Understandably, the enemy did not build a solid defensive line there, since the main forces of their offensive grouping were expected to pass through this area within weeks. However, our forces acted preemptively and punished that overconfidence. As a result, the defense began to crumble.

Western analysts mentioned earlier, citing maps by the russian propagandist Rybar, now claim that an entire enemy brigade has effectively ended up in a pocket. We have not yet seen independent confirmation of this. However, those analysts say they verified the information through multiple channels and sources they consider reliable, and that the situation is fully confirmed.

Logistical Collapse

We won’t speculate with numbers and names, but on separate sections managed to advance so deeply that the enemy started having logistical problems of another plan. Lateral roads got cut — roads by which the enemy could transfer material support and maneuver its units. There they clearly didn’t expect such a layout not even because they already got unaccustomed to how Ukrainian Armed Forces advance, but because they expected their own offensive, which everyone there knew about but didn’t know when it would start. Therefore they particularly didn’t care about strengthening their communications in the near rear.

So, we can draw two conclusions. On one hand, Ukrainian drone operators began destroying enemy assets deep in the tactical rear. As a result, the enemy rapidly lost resources prepared for the offensive. On the other hand, the enemy saw that the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not stop after advancing one or two kilometers, but pushed further. Because of this, the entire front line began to change its contours, making the original offensive plan irrelevant. In connection with this, probably Orcs decided to act according to the pre-approved plan while it wasn’t too late.

Sun Tzu and Forced Decisions

If we recall the famous treatise by Sun Tzu “The Art of War,” then among other very sensible instructions, he persistently recommended starting combat operations when there are at minimum two basic conditions. The attacking side must have the ability to designate the place and time of battle. If impossible to ensure at least one of these conditions, then one must refrain from the fight and wait for the right layout or must create it somehow.

However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces forced the enemy to launch the offensive not on their terms, but in response to Ukrainian actions. In other words, our military dictated the timing of the fight. The Orcs then stumbled over the second condition as well. Our troops pushed deep into enemy formations, which changed the location of the fight. As a result, instead of refusing the chop under conditions when there’s no control over battle’s key parameters, Orcs decided to accelerate.

“Na eto oni poyti ne mogut”

The enemy can be understood — after all, their commanders clearly told the führer that this time they’ll show a masterclass. However, judging by how events unfolded, they should have retreated and regrouped instead of advancing. But that is not an option for them. They already reported progress to the führer and cannot walk it back. At the same time, history shows a clear pattern. The Orcs know how to dig in and sit in rigid defense until they are wiped out. However, they have never been good at conducting an organized retreat. All military art textbooks say retreat is technically the most complex maneuver of all possible. Precisely during retreat, military commanders demonstrate their true worth and skills.

And with this Orcs always had it bad — because retreat among them is considered something extremely shameful that cannot be allowed under any circumstances. They’re taught to advance, but they don’t know how to maneuver in retreat. Comrade Stalin was aware how his army fled from Hitler’s forces, even in cases when there were significantly more Red Army soldiers.

Therefore with high probability one could assume Orcs won’t retreat but instead will try advancing. Precisely this they did.

Read the continuation of Russian spring offensive analysis in Part 2.

¹Orcs – a common term for Russians who support or participate in the armed aggression against Ukraine. Dehumanizing? Yes. Accurate? Also yes.