Yaroslav Honchar Interview: Co-founder of Aerorozvidka

January 17, 2025April 9, 2026

Russians changed tactics. Enemy attack drones now fly lower to strain Ukrainian air defense more. The lower the altitude, the harder detection means find objects. Ukraine currently develops new means for hitting Shaheds, particularly at low altitudes. Yaroslav Honchar interview on Ukrainian Radio: the Aerorozvidka NGO co-founder emphasized that “we shouldn’t underestimate the significance of decoy Shaheds”. According to him, Russian strikes are always complex operations. Therefore, the enemy doesn’t launch them simply to divert attention. After diversion comes the next stage — either attack by other destruction means or pulling Ukrainian resources away from directions that might become strike targets.

— Regarding Shaheds that the enemy attacks Ukraine with almost nightly. There are drones with warheads, there are those that imitate. Often we see reports that this is, say, a different type of Shahed. How are they guided, how do they perform their task, how does the enemy direct them, where do they fly, why does it often happen they fly in seemingly incomprehensible trajectories? Is this trajectory set for them? Tell us more about this.

Usually Shaheds get used in automatic mode. The mission is programmed. They fly along a predetermined route regardless of what target load they carry — whether strike drone or false decoy target. However, there were cases when we fixed presence of means allowing control during the mission. But these were rather exceptions. Predominantly these drones perform missions in autonomous mode.

— What is the role of decoy samples besides distracting air defense? How threatening are they?

Air defense distraction is a serious threat. This shouldn’t be underestimated because it’s insane resource that must be engaged. In war, resource is always insufficient. If you constantly provoke, this leads to resource dispersal. Therefore, I wouldn’t underestimate their significance.

Moreover, these are always complex operations. The enemy doesn’t launch them simply to divert attention. After diversion comes the next stage. This can manifest either in attack by other destruction means or in pulling our resources away from directions the enemy planned for itself to conduct its actions.

New Means Get Developed

— On January 11, Armed Forces officer, radio engineer, and aerial reconnaissance specialist Yuriy Kasyanov wrote on his Facebook that monitoring channels report Russian Shaheds flying very low over Ukraine and Kyiv. They weren’t detected by radars. Our air defense means, mobile groups didn’t know where they fly, where to expect them, where to shoot them down. He calls this the next stage of drone development. What can counter this?

Skillful application of our countermeasures. Currently the Ukrainian side quite qualitatively mastered counteracting Russian drones conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. Now they actively work to conduct the same counteraction regarding strike drones, Shaheds, which differ in having greater speed and being larger means themselves. Strike means, FPVs that successfully apply against Russian reconnaissance drones aren’t as effective regarding Shaheds. But work in this direction actively proceeds. I know certain successes already get achieved. The secret will be the same — competent resource application plus search and application of appropriate technological solutions.

Low altitude is simply tactic change. They simply set low altitude for the Shahed. Risks for such application lie in the fact that to apply drones very low, you must understand terrain relief very well. Because error at low altitudes can threaten the drone simply crashing into some artificial object, for example a high-rise building. If you don’t know it stands in a given place and fly very low, there’s risk of colliding with it. Therefore, nothing extraordinary here.

Why do they do this? Of course, to strain our air defense system even more. Because the lower the altitude, the harder radio direction finding means detect objects. At greater altitudes we have the opportunity to see enemy air objects from far distances. The lower they fly, the shorter the distance from which we can see them. Accordingly, reaction time decreases for applying countermeasures. This tactic change leads to us having to strain our air defense system even more and harder. Conditionally, if previously you saw an object 10 kilometers away, you had 10 minutes to react, select position, prepare weapon. When you see it only 5 minutes away, time is twice less. In such situation, time no longer suffices for movement to choose a more advantageous position.

Drone vs EW Confrontation

— How effective are our EW systems for diverting Shaheds from populated areas and thus neutralizing them on neutral territory safe for people?

This is drone versus EW confrontation. As long as the Russian-Ukrainian war lasts, so long does this confrontation last. Therefore, today this can be effective. Tomorrow they change firmware, apply new technology, and effectiveness changes. This is constant struggle that was, is, and will continue happening between drones and EW. There were periods when you could counter drones by removing navigation, suppressing navigation signals in a certain zone, because they were very dependent on this. Then time came and drones learned to orient in space without GPS navigation signals. Therefore, confrontation exists.

FPV Drones on Fiber Optics

— Radio technology expert callsign “Flash” reported news that almost a dozen Ukrainian manufacturers proved their fiber-optic drones’ operability in practice. He says with perspective that if everything goes well, especially regarding state orders, we’ll have such drones too. Now there’s information about new FPV drone on fiber optics “Gromila-10” that reconnaissance operators of “Charon-14” strike group of a separate mechanized brigade of Ukraine’s Armed Forces applied. Do you know anything about this drone and similar ones perhaps?

About this specific one no, but about similar ones yes. There are projects developing in this direction. They’ll occupy their certain niche. This is modernization. Such technology already existed long ago. Now there will be a more perfected means for today’s conditions, controlled by fiber-optic thread. It has both advantages and disadvantages. In hands of trained crew under experienced commander guidance, it will find its application on the battlefield.

Robotics Technology Guarantees Ukraine Continues Resistance

— If we talk about drone strikes deep into enemy territory, they don’t fly to us as often as Shaheds to Ukrainian territory, but it seems they occur more effectively. Do you agree with this?

We want to believe in this. Yes, I will confirm that of course our strikes are more effective than enemy strikes.

— Will they continue? Do we have means and capabilities for this?

We have no choice. The robotics technology sector is the only thing we do independently and where our dependence, though present in production components, isn’t such a situation as with other weapon types when we’re completely dependent on whether there will be delivery or not. Therefore, relying on this, I can assert this is certain guarantee for the entire nation that we’ll continue resisting. Because this is what we can make ourselves and apply ourselves. We need no one’s permissions. Everything is in our hands. How qualitatively our engineers make it, how qualitatively our military personnel apply it — on that will depend our defense going forward.

The Yaroslav Honchar interview highlights critical challenges and capabilities. decoy drones and low-altitude Shahed flights pose major threats. But Ukraine’s independence in robotics technology production guarantees Ukraine will continue resistance regardless of foreign aid fluctuations. Self-reliance in drone warfare represents Ukraine’s guarantee of sustained defense capability.